CBR Pass Rates in the Netherlands – Structural Inequality and Misleading Practices in Driver Training

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Introduction

When looking for a driving school in Amsterdam or elsewhere in the Netherlands, learners and parents often encounter bold claims: “80% pass rate!”, “Most students pass first time!”, or “The highest pass rate in the city!”. These numbers seem to signal quality, and for many, they are the deciding factor in choosing a school.

But what does a CBR pass rate really mean? And more importantly: is it accurate and fair?

Recent evidence from within the industry suggests that the current system of CBR driving school pass rates creates structural inequality and misleads consumers. Large driving schools manipulate the statistics, while smaller, high-quality schools and students are disadvantaged.

What Are CBR Pass Rates?

The CBR (Centraal Bureau Rijvaardigheidsbewijzen) publishes statistics for every registered driving school, showing how many candidates pass or fail. These include:

  • First-time exams

  • Re-exams

  • Fear of failure exams (faalangst)

  • BNOR exams (for candidates who failed multiple times)

The data is public and intended to help consumers make informed choices. At first glance, it looks objective and fair.

However, in practice, these figures are often manipulated or misinterpreted.

How Driving Schools Manipulate Pass Rates

Within the driving school industry, it is no secret that some large schools find ways to game the system. Common practices include:

1. Multiple CBR Accounts

Driving schools can register more than one CBR account. This allows them to:

  • Place strong students (high likelihood of passing) under the main account.

  • Place weak or unprepared students under secondary or “disposable” accounts.

Result: the main account shows an artificially high pass rate, which is then used in marketing.

2. Strict Selection Before Exams

Some schools only allow students to book an exam after many additional lessons, ensuring that only the best-prepared candidates are tested. This inflates pass rates but increases costs significantly for learners.

3. Creative Data Presentation

Pass rates are sometimes presented selectively – for example, advertising only first-time passes, while ignoring repeat attempts.

Why This Is Misleading

For consumers, a high pass rate seems like a guarantee of quality. In reality, it often means:

  • Higher costs – students must take far more lessons before being allowed to test.

  • No accurate reflection of the school’s average performance.

  • Consumer law concerns – figures presented as objective quality indicators are in fact manipulated.

Ultimately, learners choose schools based on misleading numbers, only to face higher bills and more stress later on.

Amsterdam as a Case Study

The inequality is most visible in Amsterdam, where:

  • Traffic is more complex – trams, cyclists, scooters and buses compete for space.

  • Road layouts are challenging – roundabouts, bridges, narrow lanes.

  • Exam pressure is higher – driving in Amsterdam is more demanding than in smaller towns.

As a result, average pass rates in Amsterdam are lower. Yet, large schools still advertise with high percentages, often based on selective data. Smaller, more transparent schools are unfairly pushed aside.

The Abolition of the Mid-Term Test (TTT)

Until 2024, learners could take a mid-term test (tussentijdse toets). Benefits included:

  • Exemption from special maneuvers if performed correctly.

  • Reduced nerves – students knew what to expect on exam day.

  • Valuable feedback from an examiner.

In 2024, the CBR abolished the mid-term test. Existing bookings were automatically converted into full practical exams.

Consequences:

  • Students who were not exam-ready were forced to test anyway.

  • Pass rates for many schools plummeted.

  • The educational value of gradual preparation was lost.

Some reputable Amsterdam schools reported a drop in pass rates from 70–80% to around 30%.

Impact on Learners and Parents

These practices and policy changes directly affect learners:

  • Unnecessary costs – forced to buy more lessons.

  • Lower chances of passing, especially in large cities.

  • Greater stress and frustration, as expectations don’t match reality.

  • Unequal opportunities – smaller, honest schools appear weaker because of distorted statistics.

For parents, this means investing more money without a guarantee of fair or higher quality training.

Impact on the Driving School Sector

The current system creates a distorted market:

  • Large schools benefit from manipulated statistics and aggressive marketing.

  • Smaller, often better-quality schools lose students.

  • Fair competition is undermined.

  • Long-term traffic safety is at risk, as students are not always trained with true educational priorities in mind.

Legal and Regulatory Concerns

Under the General Administrative Law Act (Awb), Dutch authorities must act with care and transparency. The Equal Treatment Act and consumer protection law also apply.

Key questions arise:

  • Should schools be allowed to use multiple accounts?

  • Is the CBR accountable for how pass rates are presented?

  • Should the Authority for Consumers and Markets (ACM) step in against misleading advertising?

  • How much input do smaller schools have in CBR decision-making?

So far, transparency in policy-making has been limited. For example, the decision to abolish the mid-term test was taken without broad consultation in the sector.

What Needs to Change?

1. Transparency in Data

  • Publish pass rates per candidate, per account.

  • Require schools to link all accounts to a single public profile.

2. Stronger Oversight

  • ACM and inspectorates should act against misleading claims.

  • Penalties for schools manipulating statistics.

3. Policy Reform

  • Reintroduce or replace the mid-term test.

  • Ensure students are not pushed into exams before they are ready.

4. Greater Participation

  • Include diverse schools – small and large, urban and rural – in decision-making at the CBR.

Conclusion

The current system of CBR pass rates for driving schools is not what it seems. Numbers meant to reflect quality are manipulated, creating structural inequality.

Learners and parents are misled, small schools are unfairly disadvantaged, and the educational process is undermined. With the removal of the mid-term test, the situation has only worsened.

The way forward? Transparency, oversight, and fairness. Only then can pass rates once again serve their original purpose: an honest reflection of quality and a real guide for learners choosing their driving school.

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